TRIAL REPORT
(Posted February 10, 2004)
Daniel Hoagland, Karen Hoagland and the Hoagland Family
Limited Partnership vs. Town of Clear Lake, Indiana
Steuben County Superior Court
Cause No. 76D01-9908-CP-459
Injuries: special damages claimed for the delay in the issuance of an Improvement Location Permit to
build an oversized residential storage building.
Date: February 4, 2004
Judge of Jury trial: Jury trial
Judge: The Honorable William C. Fee
Disposition: Plaintiffs’ verdict in the amount of $14,716.91.
Plaintiffs’ Attorney: John R. Price, John R. Price and Associates
Defendant’s Attorney: Bruce L. Kamplain, Norris, Choplin & Schroeder, LLP
Insurance: Tudor Insurance Company
Case information:
This matter began as a suit filed by the Town seeking an injunction against Daniel Hoagland for the
operation of his helicopter/heliport which is located in the Town of Clear Lake, Indiana and near
the lake. Daniel Hoagland, Karen Hoagland and the Hoagland Family Limited Partnership filed a third
party complaint against the Town and its Zoning Administrator. The real estate where the helipad is
located is owned by the Hoagland Family Limited Partnership, of which Daniel and Karen Hoagland are
the sole general partners.
The third party complaint was in seven counts: Counts 1
through 4 sought declarations that certain town ordinances were unconstitutional; Court 5 sought
declaratory relief that the Improvement Location Permit [ILP] [required for the construction of an
oversized residential storage building to be used for the storage of a helicopter, which is owned by
Clear Lake Management Corporation, of which Daniel Hoagland is the president, a Ski Natique speed
boat, which is owned by Hoagland Transportation FLP, a 1969 Pontiac, which is owned by Daniel
Hoagland and other personal property owned by the Hoagland’s]; and Count 7 was a claim for inverse
condemnation related to the use and operation of the helicopter/heliport.
The parties reached an amicable mediated settlement in
April 2000. As a result of this mediated settlement all claims asserted in Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and
7 were resolved completely. The only remaining issue was what damages, if any, were sustained by the
Hoagland’s due to the delay in the issuance of the ILP.
On August 27, 2001, the Court entered a final and
appealable order [which was never appealed by the Hoagland’s] which granted summary judgment to the
Town on the issues raised in Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the third party complaint. As to Count 6,
the Trial Court held that the Hoagland’s damages were limited to those damages proximately caused by
the delay in the issuance of the ILP. The Trial Court also entered judgment that punitive damages
were not recoverable in this litigation.
On March 22, 2002, the Trial Court entered its order on
the Town’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine and ruled that attorney fees and related costs of
litigation to secure the ILP were not recoverable in the litigation.
This case made a trip to the Indiana Court of Appeals
following the grant of summary judgment to the Town on the issue of immunity under the Indiana Tort
Claims Act. In its March 18, 2003 unpublished opinion, Judge Kirsch, with concurrence by Judges
Sharpnack and Sullivan, ruled on the following issue: whether the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of the Town based on governmental immunity when the Town previously
entered into a settlement agreement providing for the payment of damages in an amount to be
subsequently determined. The appellate court held that the plain and unambiguous provision of the
settlement agreement obligated the Town to pay damages. The appellate court then remanded for trial
the sole issue of damages for delay in issuing the ILP, specifically noting that all other issues
were laid to rest by the settlement agreement.
Following remand, the Trial Court entered an order on
September 9, 2003, on the Hoagland’s petition to establish criteria for damages. The Trial Court
ruled that the sole issue for trial was the claim for damages caused by the delay in the issuance of
the ILP. Whether the Town was liable for these damages was no longer an issue in the litigation. The
issue of liability was resolved in the April 2000 mediated settlement.
During discovery the Hoagland’s submitted documentation
to support their claim for damages which included expenses to store the speed boat that was owned by
the Hoagland Transportation FLP, lost income for the storage of the helicopter which was owned by
Clear Lake Management Corporation, costs of allegedly damaged helicopter blades, increased costs of
financing, increased costs of construction, costs associated with constructing the building in the
winter, costs associated with work that Dan Hoagland could have performed but in fact did not,
attorney fees, litigation costs and the cost of mediation,. These “damages” totaled $103,997.68.
Several mediations were conducted to resolve the “delay
damages” issue, but all were unsuccessful. Mediation was conducted on Friday, January 30, 2004, just
days before the jury trial. During these multiple mediation sessions the Hoagland’s settlement
demands for the “delay damages” began at $3.4 million, escalated to $24 million, and began at
$84,000 plus at the January 30, 2004 mediation. The Town’s last settlement offer was $28,000.00 and
the Hoagland’s last settlement demand was $44,000.00.
Jury trial began and concluded on Wednesday, February 4,
2004. The Hoagland’s had prepared a summary of damages demonstrative exhibit that totaled their
damages at $ 39,632.88; but due to a miscalculation of a certain claim of increased financing, the
exhibit was revised and the total damages claimed was reduced to $34,326.12. The verdict was
$14,716.91.
The Hoagland’s were able to introduce into evidence all
of their exhibits that allegedly documented their claim for damages. There were only two witnesses
at trial: Daniel and Karen Hoagland. Each was able to explain to the jury why they believed that
certain costs or expenses were caused by the delay in the issuance of the ILP.
An interesting dynamic of the trial was that the Court
permitted the parties’ counsel to present a mini opening statement during voir dire. Both counsels
took advantage of this opportunity. However, after the jury had been selected [5 women and 1 man,
with no alternate], counsel for the Hoagland’s waived opening statement. Counsel for the Town took
advantage of this opportunity and presented an opening statement.
From the verdict amount, it is apparent that the jury
awarded damages on the increased cost of construction, the storage of the car, and the increased
cost of financing. All other claims for damages were rejected by the jury.
In a news article appearing in the February 5, 2004 issue
of the Angola Herald-Republican, Mr. Hoagland stated that he intends to appeal this verdict on the
basis that the Trial Court excluded his claim for attorney fees. He also stated that he reached this
decision before the trial began.
The general rule in Indiana is that each party to the
litigation must pay his own counsel fees. They are not allowable in the absence of a statute, or in
the absence of some agreement or stipulation specially authorizing the allowance and the rule
applies equally in courts of law and in courts of equity. Trotcky v. Van Sickle (1949), 227 Ind.
441, 85 N.E.2d 638; St. Joseph's College v. Morrison, Inc., (1973), 158 Ind. App. 272, 302 N.E.2d
865.
Bruce L. Kamplain (#5065-49)
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